Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles

Jesper Kallestrup

doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9319-5

Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles

Jesper Kallestrup^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

University of Edinburgh

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke's modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis' objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright's proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	377-386
Number of pages	10
Journal	Synthese
Volume	171
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9319-5
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2009

Keywords

Conceivability
Counterpossibles
Kripke
Rigidity
The identity theory

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10.1007/s11229-008-9319-5

Cite this

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Conceivability, rigidity and counterpossibles

Abstract

Keywords

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