Concluding Remarks: Seemings and Epistemic Justification

Luca Moretti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this chapter I draw the conclusions of my investigation into phenomenal conservatism. I argue that phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually plagued by serious problems attributed to it by its opponents, but that it neither possesses all the epistemic merits that its advocates think it has. I suggest that phenomenal conservatism could provide a more satisfactory account of everyday epistemic practices and a more robust response to the sceptic if it were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. I also identify questions and issues relevant to the assessment of phenomenal conservatism to be investigated in further research.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSeemings and Epistemic Justification
Subtitle of host publicationHow Appearances Justify Beliefs
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages89-91
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-43392-5
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-43391-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 10 Mar 2020

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Philosophy
ISSN (Print)2211-4548
ISSN (Electronic)2211-4556

Keywords

  • Foundationalism
  • Global ambitions of phenomenal conservatism
  • Inferential and non-inferential justification
  • Phenomenal conservatism
  • Reflective justification
  • Scepticism

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