Counterfactuals and downward causation: A reply to Zhong

Jonas Christensen*, Jesper Kallestrup

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)513-517
Number of pages5
Issue number3
Early online date1 Jun 2012
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2012


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