Abstract
Lei Zhong (2012. Counterfactuals, regularity and the autonomy approach. Analysis 72: 75–85) argues that non-reductive physicalists cannot establish the autonomy of mental causation by adopting a counterfactual theory of causation since such a theory supports a so-called downward causation argument which rules out mental-to-mental causation. We respond that non-reductive physicalists can consistently resist Zhong's downward causation argument as it equivocates between two familiar notions of a physical realizer.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 513-517 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Analysis |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 1 Jun 2012 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2012 |