Epistemic Deferral, Gnoseology and Intellectual Ethics

Jesper Kallestrup; Edoardo Cavasin

doi:10.1007/s44204-025-00287-7

Epistemic Deferral, Gnoseology and Intellectual Ethics

Jesper Kallestrup^* (Corresponding Author), Edoardo Cavasin

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Sosa (2021) presented a dichotomy between, as he puts it, the humanistic domain, in which we seek first-hand understanding why of questions of value and normativity through our own intuitive insight, and the practical domain in which we defer to epistemic authorities for information that correctly answers utilitarian questions. However, this neat picture is too simplistic. To use Sosa’s terminology, whereas gnoseology also applies in the humanistic domain, intellectual ethics is very much equally about the practical domain. Moreover, the distinction between first- and second-hand knowledge doesn’t coincide with any such distinction between domains of inquiry. In this paper, we first develop a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic deferral, which displays Sosa’s (2021) triple-A and triple-S structures, and reflects his different levels of telic assessment. We then show how this account not only pertains to both domains, but also explains why there is no real tension between conducting our epistemic inquiries autonomously and deferring to the epistemic authorities for knowledge that we are incapable of acquiring ourselves.

Original language	English
Article number	62
Number of pages	21
Journal	Asian Journal of Philosophy
Volume	4
Issue number	1
Early online date	24 May 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-025-00287-7
Publication status	Published - Jun 2025

Bibliographical note

This research involves no humans or animals, and so no study-specific approval by any appropriate ethics committee is needed. There are no financial conflicts of interest either. Many thanks to two anonymous referees for helpful comments and constructive suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.

Open Access via the SpringerNature agreement

Data Availability Statement

We do not analyse or generate any datasets, because our work proceeds within a theoretical and mathematical approach.

Funding

We are also grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council (Grant No. AH/W008424/1) for funding this research.

Funders	Funder number
Arts and Humanities Research Council	AH/W008424/1

Keywords

Sosa
Virtue epistemology
Epistemic deferral
Gnoseology
Intellectual ethics

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Cite this

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abstract = "Sosa (2021) presented a dichotomy between, as he puts it, the humanistic domain, in which we seek first-hand understanding why of questions of value and normativity through our own intuitive insight, and the practical domain in which we defer to epistemic authorities for information that correctly answers utilitarian questions. However, this neat picture is too simplistic. To use Sosa{\textquoteright}s terminology, whereas gnoseology also applies in the humanistic domain, intellectual ethics is very much equally about the practical domain. Moreover, the distinction between first- and second-hand knowledge doesn{\textquoteright}t coincide with any such distinction between domains of inquiry. In this paper, we first develop a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic deferral, which displays Sosa{\textquoteright}s (2021) triple-A and triple-S structures, and reflects his different levels of telic assessment. We then show how this account not only pertains to both domains, but also explains why there is no real tension between conducting our epistemic inquiries autonomously and deferring to the epistemic authorities for knowledge that we are incapable of acquiring ourselves.",

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Epistemic Deferral, Gnoseology and Intellectual Ethics

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Data Availability Statement

Funding

Keywords

Access to Document

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