Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives

Aaron J. Cotnoir

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Christine Tappolet (2000) posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny the truth of conjunctions whose conjuncts are from distinct domains of inquiry, or posit a generic global truth property thus making other truth properties redundant. Douglas Edwards (2008) has attempted to solve the problem by avoiding the horns of Tappolet's dilemma. After first noting an unappreciated consequence of Edwards's view regarding a proliferation of truth properties, I show that Edwards's proposal fails to avoid Tappolet's original dilemma. His response is not successful, as it lets in a generic truth property through the ‘back door’. I conclude by briefly offering a new solution to the problem, and an alternative diagnosis of Tappolet's dilemma.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)473-479
Number of pages7
Issue number3
Early online date14 Jun 2009
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2009


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