Abstract
Christine Tappolet (2000) posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny the truth of conjunctions whose conjuncts are from distinct domains of inquiry, or posit a generic global truth property thus making other truth properties redundant. Douglas Edwards (2008) has attempted to solve the problem by avoiding the horns of Tappolet's dilemma. After first noting an unappreciated consequence of Edwards's view regarding a proliferation of truth properties, I show that Edwards's proposal fails to avoid Tappolet's original dilemma. His response is not successful, as it lets in a generic truth property through the ‘back door’. I conclude by briefly offering a new solution to the problem, and an alternative diagnosis of Tappolet's dilemma.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 473-479 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Analysis |
| Volume | 69 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 14 Jun 2009 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jul 2009 |
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