Monkeypox virus isolation from longitudinal samples in 11 hospitalised patients

ISARIC4C Investigators

doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(24)00735-7

Monkeypox virus isolation from longitudinal samples in 11 hospitalised patients

ISARIC4C Investigators

Research output: Contribution to journal › Letter › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Monkeypox virus (MPXV) causes mpox, a disease largely confined to west and central Africa until 2022, when the global spread of MPXV clade IIb was declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). Another PHEIC was declared in 2024 following the spread of MPXV clade I in Africa. Human transmission occurs mainly through contact with infectious lesions.1 While diagnostic swabs' PCR cycle threshold (Ct) is assumed to correlate with infectiousness, the evidence is weak.2, 3 Prolonged MPXV shedding is widely reported, but the duration of infectiousness remains unclear

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	e4-e5
Number of pages	2
Journal	The Lancet Infectious Diseases
Volume	25
Issue number	1
Early online date	27 Dec 2024
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(24)00735-7
Publication status	Published - Jan 2025

Bibliographical note

The research was supported by The Pandemic Institute, formed of seven founding partners: The University of Liverpool, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool City Council, Liverpool City Region Combined Authority, Liverpool University Hospital Foundation Trust, and Knowledge Quarter Liverpool. MGS is based at The University of Liverpool. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of The Pandemic Institute. MGS has additionally received funding for this work from the UK Medical Research Council. MGS is an independent external and nonremunerated member of Pfizer’s External Data Monitoring Committee for their mRNA vaccine programme(s); Chair of Infectious Disease Scientific Advisory Board for Integrum Scientific, Greensboro, NC, USA; and director and majority shareholder of MedEx Solutions. MGS is minority shareholder in Integrum Scientific, Greensboro, NC, USA. MGS has received gifts to their institution in the form of investigational medicinal product from Chiesi Farmaceutici. All other authors declare no competing interests. HC, CH, TR, JO, and KR accessed and verified the data in this study. Information on ethical approvals is provided in the appendix (p 6). The ISARIC4C investigators are listed in the appendix (pp 1–2).

Funding

CFH received funding for this study from the Healthcare Infection Society (SRG/2022/03/002), via the UK Health Security Agency. The funders of the study had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. JD, MGS, JKB, and ISARIC4C are supported by the National Institute for Health and Care Research (NIHR) Health Protection Research Unit in Emerging and Zoonotic Infections at the University of Liverpool in partnership with the UK Heath Security Agency, in collaboration with Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and the University of Oxford (NIHR award 200907).

Funders	Funder number
UK Health Security Agency	SRG/2022/03/002

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being

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10.1016/S1473-3099(24)00735-7Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

@article{c4dacc43ffcf4a8e8bb20ea45cf446ad,

title = "Monkeypox virus isolation from longitudinal samples in 11 hospitalised patients",

abstract = "Monkeypox virus (MPXV) causes mpox, a disease largely confined to west and central Africa until 2022, when the global spread of MPXV clade IIb was declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). Another PHEIC was declared in 2024 following the spread of MPXV clade I in Africa. Human transmission occurs mainly through contact with infectious lesions.1 While diagnostic swabs' PCR cycle threshold (Ct) is assumed to correlate with infectiousness, the evidence is weak.2, 3 Prolonged MPXV shedding is widely reported, but the duration of infectiousness remains unclear",

author = "Helen Callaby and Janie Olver and Kirsty Emery and Richards, \{Kevin S.\} and Marian Killip and Natalie Groves and Beadsworth, \{Mike B.J.\} and Price, \{D. Ashley\} and Cooke, \{Graham S.\} and Paul Collini and Joby Cole and Jake Dunning and Semple, \{Malcolm G.\} and Baillie, \{J. Kenneth\} and Gail Carson and Peter Openshaw and Laura Merson and Russell, \{Clark D.\} and Maria Zambon and Meera Chand and Richard Tedder and Saye Khoo and Peter Horby and Turtle, \{Lance CW\} and Tom Solomon and Samreen Ijaz and Tom Fletcher and Massimo Palmarini and Antonia Ho and Nicholas Price and Beatrice Alex and Petros Andrikopoulos and Benjamin Black and Barclay, \{Wendy S.\} and Debby Bogaert and Kanta Chechi and \{Da Silva Filipe\}, Ana and \{De Silva\}, Thushan and Docherty, \{Annemarie B.\} and \{Dos Santos Correia\}, Gon{\c c}alo and Dumas, \{Marc Emmanuel\} and Green, \{Christopher A.\} and William Greenhalf and Griffin, \{Julian L.\} and Rishi Gupta and Harrison, \{Ewen M.\} and Karl Holden and David Robertson and Scott, \{Janet T.\} and David Stuart and \{ISARIC4C Investigators\}",

note = "The research was supported by The Pandemic Institute, formed of seven founding partners: The University of Liverpool, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool City Council, Liverpool City Region Combined Authority, Liverpool University Hospital Foundation Trust, and Knowledge Quarter Liverpool. MGS is based at The University of Liverpool. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of The Pandemic Institute. MGS has additionally received funding for this work from the UK Medical Research Council. MGS is an independent external and nonremunerated member of Pfizer{\textquoteright}s External Data Monitoring Committee for their mRNA vaccine programme(s); Chair of Infectious Disease Scientific Advisory Board for Integrum Scientific, Greensboro, NC, USA; and director and majority shareholder of MedEx Solutions. MGS is minority shareholder in Integrum Scientific, Greensboro, NC, USA. MGS has received gifts to their institution in the form of investigational medicinal product from Chiesi Farmaceutici. All other authors declare no competing interests. HC, CH, TR, JO, and KR accessed and verified the data in this study. Information on ethical approvals is provided in the appendix (p 6). The ISARIC4C investigators are listed in the appendix (pp 1–2).",

year = "2025",

month = jan,

doi = "10.1016/S1473-3099(24)00735-7",

language = "English",

volume = "25",

pages = "e4--e5",

journal = "The Lancet Infectious Diseases",

issn = "1473-3099",

publisher = "Elsevier Limited",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Monkeypox virus isolation from longitudinal samples in 11 hospitalised patients

AU - Callaby, Helen

AU - Olver, Janie

AU - Emery, Kirsty

AU - Richards, Kevin S.

AU - Killip, Marian

AU - Groves, Natalie

AU - Beadsworth, Mike B.J.

AU - Price, D. Ashley

AU - Cooke, Graham S.

AU - Collini, Paul

AU - Cole, Joby

AU - Dunning, Jake

AU - Semple, Malcolm G.

AU - Baillie, J. Kenneth

AU - Carson, Gail

AU - Openshaw, Peter

AU - Merson, Laura

AU - Russell, Clark D.

AU - Zambon, Maria

AU - Chand, Meera

AU - Tedder, Richard

AU - Khoo, Saye

AU - Horby, Peter

AU - Turtle, Lance CW

AU - Solomon, Tom

AU - Ijaz, Samreen

AU - Fletcher, Tom

AU - Palmarini, Massimo

AU - Ho, Antonia

AU - Price, Nicholas

AU - Alex, Beatrice

AU - Andrikopoulos, Petros

AU - Black, Benjamin

AU - Barclay, Wendy S.

AU - Bogaert, Debby

AU - Chechi, Kanta

AU - Da Silva Filipe, Ana

AU - De Silva, Thushan

AU - Docherty, Annemarie B.

AU - Dos Santos Correia, Gonçalo

AU - Dumas, Marc Emmanuel

AU - Green, Christopher A.

AU - Greenhalf, William

AU - Griffin, Julian L.

AU - Gupta, Rishi

AU - Harrison, Ewen M.

AU - Holden, Karl

AU - Robertson, David

AU - Scott, Janet T.

AU - Stuart, David

AU - ISARIC4C Investigators

N1 - The research was supported by The Pandemic Institute, formed of seven founding partners: The University of Liverpool, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool City Council, Liverpool City Region Combined Authority, Liverpool University Hospital Foundation Trust, and Knowledge Quarter Liverpool. MGS is based at The University of Liverpool. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of The Pandemic Institute. MGS has additionally received funding for this work from the UK Medical Research Council. MGS is an independent external and nonremunerated member of Pfizer’s External Data Monitoring Committee for their mRNA vaccine programme(s); Chair of Infectious Disease Scientific Advisory Board for Integrum Scientific, Greensboro, NC, USA; and director and majority shareholder of MedEx Solutions. MGS is minority shareholder in Integrum Scientific, Greensboro, NC, USA. MGS has received gifts to their institution in the form of investigational medicinal product from Chiesi Farmaceutici. All other authors declare no competing interests. HC, CH, TR, JO, and KR accessed and verified the data in this study. Information on ethical approvals is provided in the appendix (p 6). The ISARIC4C investigators are listed in the appendix (pp 1–2).

PY - 2025/1

Y1 - 2025/1

N2 - Monkeypox virus (MPXV) causes mpox, a disease largely confined to west and central Africa until 2022, when the global spread of MPXV clade IIb was declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). Another PHEIC was declared in 2024 following the spread of MPXV clade I in Africa. Human transmission occurs mainly through contact with infectious lesions.1 While diagnostic swabs' PCR cycle threshold (Ct) is assumed to correlate with infectiousness, the evidence is weak.2, 3 Prolonged MPXV shedding is widely reported, but the duration of infectiousness remains unclear

AB - Monkeypox virus (MPXV) causes mpox, a disease largely confined to west and central Africa until 2022, when the global spread of MPXV clade IIb was declared a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). Another PHEIC was declared in 2024 following the spread of MPXV clade I in Africa. Human transmission occurs mainly through contact with infectious lesions.1 While diagnostic swabs' PCR cycle threshold (Ct) is assumed to correlate with infectiousness, the evidence is weak.2, 3 Prolonged MPXV shedding is widely reported, but the duration of infectiousness remains unclear

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85212610045

U2 - 10.1016/S1473-3099(24)00735-7

DO - 10.1016/S1473-3099(24)00735-7

M3 - Letter

C2 - 39617024

AN - SCOPUS:85212610045

SN - 1473-3099

VL - 25

SP - e4-e5

JO - The Lancet Infectious Diseases

JF - The Lancet Infectious Diseases

IS - 1

ER -

Monkeypox virus isolation from longitudinal samples in 11 hospitalised patients

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Funding

UN SDGs

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