Persons, Unique Value and Avatars

Paula Sweeney

doi:10.1007/s11023-025-09715-2

Persons, Unique Value and Avatars

Paula Sweeney^* (Corresponding Author)

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

An individual human has value partly in virtue of their uniqueness. Personal avatar technology—technology which creates a digital replication of a real person—appears to have the potential to undermine that value. Here I explore if and how avatars might make humans less valuable by undermining the value that a human gains from being unique. Ultimately, I conclude that, while avatars cannot make humans no longer unique, they could significantly undermine the value that we place on human uniqueness. First, I argue that a qualitative model of uniqueness cannot account for the unique value that a person has. This leads to the significant and surprising claim that necessarily unique properties of humans cannot accommodate the value arising from human uniqueness: humans have unique value in virtue of being contingently irreplaceable. I explore how the use of personal avatars might undermine or even destroy that value. Finally, I consider further applications of the theory of unique human value, including how it might explain and accommodate our attachment to personal avatars themselves.

Original language	English
Article number	13
Number of pages	14
Journal	Minds and Machines
Volume	35
Issue number	2
Early online date	28 Feb 2025
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-025-09715-2
Publication status	E-pub ahead of print - 28 Feb 2025
Event	The Ethics of Generative AI and Conversational Agents - LMU Munich , Munich, Germany Duration: 12 Sept 2024 → 13 Sept 2024 https://mcml.ai/events/2024-09-12-ethics-conference/

Bibliographical note

Open Access via the Springer Nature Agreeement

Thanks to two anonymous referees for this journal for comments that greatly improved the work. I would also like to thank participants at workshops where I presented versions of this paper, in particular The Ethics of Generative AI and Conversational Agents at Ludwig Maximilians University and avataResponsibility 2024: Where no proxy has gone before: avatars and responsibility frameworks at University of Bucharest as part of the ERC funded project avataResponsibility.

Keywords

Avatars
Uniqueness
Value of uniqueness
Personhood
Digital duplicates

Access to Document

10.1007/s11023-025-09715-2Licence: CC BY

Sweeney_MM_Persons_Unique_Value_VoR
This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Final published version, 728 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{1a30a7acde9f426c95e9d3d03a874cee,

title = "Persons, Unique Value and Avatars",

abstract = "An individual human has value partly in virtue of their uniqueness. Personal avatar technology—technology which creates a digital replication of a real person—appears to have the potential to undermine that value. Here I explore if and how avatars might make humans less valuable by undermining the value that a human gains from being unique. Ultimately, I conclude that, while avatars cannot make humans no longer unique, they could significantly undermine the value that we place on human uniqueness. First, I argue that a qualitative model of uniqueness cannot account for the unique value that a person has. This leads to the significant and surprising claim that necessarily unique properties of humans cannot accommodate the value arising from human uniqueness: humans have unique value in virtue of being contingently irreplaceable. I explore how the use of personal avatars might undermine or even destroy that value. Finally, I consider further applications of the theory of unique human value, including how it might explain and accommodate our attachment to personal avatars themselves.",

keywords = "Avatars, Uniqueness, Value of uniqueness, Personhood, Digital duplicates",

author = "Paula Sweeney",

note = "Open Access via the Springer Nature Agreeement Thanks to two anonymous referees for this journal for comments that greatly improved the work. I would also like to thank participants at workshops where I presented versions of this paper, in particular The Ethics of Generative AI and Conversational Agents at Ludwig Maximilians University and avataResponsibility 2024: Where no proxy has gone before: avatars and responsibility frameworks at University of Bucharest as part of the ERC funded project avataResponsibility.; The Ethics of Generative AI and Conversational Agents ; Conference date: 12-09-2024 Through 13-09-2024",

year = "2025",

month = feb,

day = "28",

doi = "10.1007/s11023-025-09715-2",

language = "English",

volume = "35",

journal = "Minds and Machines",

issn = "0924-6495",

publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

number = "2",

url = "https://mcml.ai/events/2024-09-12-ethics-conference/",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Persons, Unique Value and Avatars

AU - Sweeney, Paula

N1 - Open Access via the Springer Nature Agreeement Thanks to two anonymous referees for this journal for comments that greatly improved the work. I would also like to thank participants at workshops where I presented versions of this paper, in particular The Ethics of Generative AI and Conversational Agents at Ludwig Maximilians University and avataResponsibility 2024: Where no proxy has gone before: avatars and responsibility frameworks at University of Bucharest as part of the ERC funded project avataResponsibility.

PY - 2025/2/28

Y1 - 2025/2/28

N2 - An individual human has value partly in virtue of their uniqueness. Personal avatar technology—technology which creates a digital replication of a real person—appears to have the potential to undermine that value. Here I explore if and how avatars might make humans less valuable by undermining the value that a human gains from being unique. Ultimately, I conclude that, while avatars cannot make humans no longer unique, they could significantly undermine the value that we place on human uniqueness. First, I argue that a qualitative model of uniqueness cannot account for the unique value that a person has. This leads to the significant and surprising claim that necessarily unique properties of humans cannot accommodate the value arising from human uniqueness: humans have unique value in virtue of being contingently irreplaceable. I explore how the use of personal avatars might undermine or even destroy that value. Finally, I consider further applications of the theory of unique human value, including how it might explain and accommodate our attachment to personal avatars themselves.

AB - An individual human has value partly in virtue of their uniqueness. Personal avatar technology—technology which creates a digital replication of a real person—appears to have the potential to undermine that value. Here I explore if and how avatars might make humans less valuable by undermining the value that a human gains from being unique. Ultimately, I conclude that, while avatars cannot make humans no longer unique, they could significantly undermine the value that we place on human uniqueness. First, I argue that a qualitative model of uniqueness cannot account for the unique value that a person has. This leads to the significant and surprising claim that necessarily unique properties of humans cannot accommodate the value arising from human uniqueness: humans have unique value in virtue of being contingently irreplaceable. I explore how the use of personal avatars might undermine or even destroy that value. Finally, I consider further applications of the theory of unique human value, including how it might explain and accommodate our attachment to personal avatars themselves.

KW - Avatars

KW - Uniqueness

KW - Value of uniqueness

KW - Personhood

KW - Digital duplicates

U2 - 10.1007/s11023-025-09715-2

DO - 10.1007/s11023-025-09715-2

M3 - Article

SN - 0924-6495

VL - 35

JO - Minds and Machines

JF - Minds and Machines

IS - 2

M1 - 13

T2 - The Ethics of Generative AI and Conversational Agents

Y2 - 12 September 2024 through 13 September 2024

ER -

Persons, Unique Value and Avatars

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this