Abstract
I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions in terms of the context-sensitivity of universal quantifiers provides an appealing approach to knowledge. Among the virtues of this approach are solutions to the skeptical paradox and the Gettier problem. I respond to influential objections to Lewis's account.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 383-398 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 155 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2011 |
Bibliographical note
For valuable conversations, and for and comments on previous drafts of this project, I am grateful to Jessica Brown, Yuri Cath, Stewart Cohen, Paul Dimmock, Benjamin Jarvis, Carrie Jenkins, Ernest Sosa, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, and Crispin Wright.Keywords
- knowledge
- epistemology
- contextualism
- the Gettier problem
- skepticism
- the skeptical paradox
- quantifiers
- David Lewis