Abstract
According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance’s inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its anti-sceptical bite. This paper provides a novel argument to the same conclusion and contends that it does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the appearance-based account of justification alternative to PC defended by McCain and Moretti (2021).
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Erkenntnis |
Early online date | 8 Mar 2024 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 8 Mar 2024 |
Data Availability Statement
No data availabiity statement.Keywords
- Appearance
- Phenomenal Conservatism
- Phenomenal
- Explanationism
- Seeming