Reflective awareness, phenomenal conservatism and phenomenal explanationism

Kevin McCain* (Corresponding Author), Luca Moretti

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance’s inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its anti-sceptical bite. This paper provides a novel argument to the same conclusion and contends that it does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the appearance-based account of justification alternative to PC defended by McCain and Moretti (2021).
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages8
JournalErkenntnis
Early online date8 Mar 2024
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 8 Mar 2024

Data Availability Statement

No data availabiity statement.

Keywords

  • Appearance
  • Phenomenal Conservatism
  • Phenomenal
  • Explanationism
  • Seeming

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