Simplifying Alethic Pluralism

Douglas Owain Edwards

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)


What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)28-48
Number of pages21
JournalThe Southern Journal of Philosophy
Issue number1
Early online date1 Mar 2011
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2011


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