State of Nature

Spinoza discusses a pre-political “state of nature” in the Ethics (E4p37s2) and in his political texts (TTP16.2–12; TP2). While he adopts the terminology of natural law theorists, scholars are divided as to his adherence to its principles (Curley 1991; Steinberg 2018a; Santos Campos 2012; Balibar 1997; James 2020b). Like Hobbes (L13; DC1), he conceives the state of nature as the condition of human life prior to the introduction of sovereign authority, civil laws, and moral norms. It is a state in which people are driven by their affects and constrained only by the greater powers of others. Unlike Hobbes, however, Spinoza understands the state of nature to follow from the infinite power of God, and its laws to follow from the essences of the infinite individuals that constitute nature as a whole. Since “man is only a small part” of nature, the state of nature is not organized for human advantage (TTP16.10), and our rights and moral obligations cannot be derived from it.