Abstract
In J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, Leitgeb provides a theory of truth which is based on a theory of semantic dependence. We argue here that the conceptual thrust of this approach provides us with the best way of dealing with semantic paradoxes in a manner that is acceptable to a classical logician. However, in investigating a problem that was raised at the end of J Philos Logic 34:155–192, 2005, we discover that something is missing from Leitgeb’s original definition. Moreover, we show that once the appropriate repairs have been made, the resultant definition is equivalent to a version of the supervaluation definition suggested in J Philos 72:690–716, 1975 and discussed in detail in J Symb Log 51(3):663–681, 1986. The upshot of this is a philosophical justification for the simple supervaluation approach and fresh insight into its workings.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 221-240 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Journal of Philosophical Logic |
Volume | 42 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 6 Jan 2012 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2013 |
Keywords
- truth
- semantic truth definition
- dependence
- supervaluation
- Leitgeb
- Kripke
- revision theory of truth