Truth values and proof theory

G. Restall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Citations (Scopus)


I present an account of truth values for classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and the modal logic S5, in which truth values are not a fundamental category from which the logic is defined, but rather, an idealisation of more fundamental logical features in the proof theory for each system. The result is not a new set of semantic structures, but a new understanding of how the existing semantic structures may be understood in terms of a more fundamental notion of logical consequence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-264
Number of pages24
JournalStudia Logica
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2009


Dive into the research topics of 'Truth values and proof theory'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this