A Universal Philosophy of Confidence-Informed Social Motivation

Roger David Wood

Research output: Book/ReportBook


Humans are natural philosophizers who are constantly forming interpretations and expectations based upon their perceptions and prior experiences, including their familiarity with particular people and activities, and the social contexts within which these are situated. As human individuals, we all have an innate sense of philosophy in common. As individuals, the majority of us may be described as natural philosophers in that we are naturally philosophical about our lifeworld experiences and our need to interpret these as a basis for informing our understanding. This book introduces a novel theory which encompasses the Philosophy of Confidence-Informed Social Motivation (PCISM) and Philopsychlical Hermeneutics. The theory asserts that human individuals and groups function at optimum philosophical and psychological levels when their confidence, motivation, familiarity and expectation levels are at their peak. Confidence and motivation influence each other and work together as a dynamic combination of philosophical interpretations and psychological reactions which result in reciprocal interpretive feedback. Within the term philopsychlical, confidence, motivation, familiarity and expectation are presented as universal informants and influences upon human behaviour within all social contexts. PCISM is in the early stages of its evolution: however, the key tenets are discussed and presented here in such a way that they may be applied across all domains of human knowledge, behaviour and endeavour as a means of enhancing our further understanding of the universal economics of human behaviour.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationNewcastle, UK
PublisherCambridge Scholars Publishing
Number of pages176
ISBN (Print)978-1-5275-4863-3
Publication statusPublished - 30 Apr 2020


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