An Adversarial Algorithm for Delegation

Juan Afanador, M. S. Baptista, Nir Oren

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingPublished conference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)
17 Downloads (Pure)


Task delegation lies at the heart of the service economy, and is a fundamental aspect of many agent marketplaces. Research in computational trust considers which agent a task should be delegated to for execution, given the agent’s past behaviour. However, such work does not consider the effects of the agent delegating the task onwards, forming a chain of delegations before the task is finally executed (as occurs in many human outsourcing scenarios). In this paper we consider such delegation chains, and empirically demonstrate that existing trust based approaches do not handle these situations as well. We then introduce a new algorithm based on quitting games, to cater for recursive delegation.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAgreement Technologies
Subtitle of host publication6th International Conference, AT 2018, Bergen, Norway, December 6-7, 2018, Revised Selected Papers
EditorsMarin Lujak
Place of PublicationCham
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9783030172947
ISBN (Print)9783030172930
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Event6th International Conference on Agreement Technologies - University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
Duration: 6 Dec 20187 Dec 2018

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference6th International Conference on Agreement Technologies
Abbreviated titleAT 2018


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