In multiagent systems, agents might interfere with each other as a side-effect of their activities. One approach to coordinating these agents is to restrict their activities by means of social norms whose violation results in sanctions to violating agents. We formalize a normative system within a stochastic environment and norm enforcement follows a stochastic model in which stricter enforcement entails higher cost. Within this type of system, we provide an approach to analize the tradeoff between norm enforcement efficiency and its cost considering a population of norm-aware selfish agents.
|Title of host publication||ECAI 2014 - 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence|
|Subtitle of host publication||Including Prestigious Applications of Intelligent Systems, PAIS 2014|
|Editors||Torsten Schaub, Gerhard Friedrich, Barry O'Sullivan|
|Number of pages||2|
|Publication status||Published - 2014|
|Event||21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014 - Prague, Czech Republic|
Duration: 18 Aug 2014 → 22 Aug 2014
|Name||Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications|
|Conference||21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2014|
|Period||18/08/14 → 22/08/14|
Bibliographical notePublisher Copyright:
© 2014 The Authors and IOS Press.