Cognitive Penetrability

Luca Moretti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSeemings and Epistemic Justification
Subtitle of host publicationHow Appearances Justify Beliefs
Place of PublicationCham, Switzerland
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Number of pages34
ISBN (Electronic)2211-4556
ISBN (Print)2211-4548
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Philosophy
ISSN (Print)2211-4548
ISSN (Electronic)2211-4556


  • Cognitive penetrability
  • Inferentialism
  • Perceptual justification
  • Perceptual seemings
  • Phenomenal conservatism
  • Proper function
  • Reliabilism


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