@techreport{71717092a0dd4101b0ae839cdcf64b45,
title = "Contracting in the Trust Game",
abstract = "We present a simple mechanism that can be implemented in a simple experiment. In a modified trust game, the allocator can offer to pay the investor to cooperate. The mechanism is successful at implementing efficient outcomes: participants manage to achieve an efficient outcome, when this is possible, two-thirds of the time. While these results are encouraging, we find evidence that both concerns for fairness and motivation crowding out distort the incentives presented in the mechanism. ",
keywords = "compensation mechanism, side payment, trust game, signaling, crowding out, concerns for equity, taste for cooperation",
author = "J{\"u}rgen Bracht",
year = "2010",
month = jul,
day = "24",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.1647006",
language = "English",
series = "SSRN",
publisher = "SSRN",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "SSRN",
}