End-of-Day Price Manipulation and M&As

Douglas Cumming* (Corresponding Author), Shan JI, Sofia Johan, Monika Tarsalewska

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)


Based on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) from over 45 countries from 2003 to 2014, we show that the presence of end-of-day (EOD) target price manipulation prior to M&As increases the probability of an M&A deal withdrawal, and decreases the premium paid. More detailed exchange trading rules that govern manipulation across countries and over time lower the probability of withdrawal, mitigate the negative impact of EOD manipulation on withdrawal and raise premiums paid. Finally, while there are fewer cases of acquirer price manipulations prior to M&As, the data indicates positive acquirer price manipulation in share M&As and increases the probability of deal withdrawal.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)184-205
Number of pages22
JournalBritish Journal of Management
Issue number1
Early online date28 Jun 2019
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

Bibliographical note

Funding Information
Social Sciences Research Humanities Council of Canada
European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. Grant Number: 665778
National Science Centre, Poland. Grant Number: 2016/23/P/HS4/04032 POLONEZ


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