Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching

Luca Moretti* (Corresponding Author), Crispin Wright

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


One type of argument to sceptical paradox proceeds by making a case that a certain kind of metaphysically “heavyweight or “cornerstone” proposition is beyond all possible evidence and hence may not be known or justifiably believed. Crispin Wright has argued that we can concede that our acceptance of these propositions is evidentially risky and still remain rationally entitled to those of our ordinary knowledge claims that are seemingly threatened by that concession. A problem for Wright’s proposal is the so-called Leaching worry: if we are merely rationally entitled to accept the cornerstones without evidence, how can we achieve evidence-based knowledge of the multitude of quotidian propositions that we think we know, which require the cornerstones to be true? This paper presents a rigorous, novel explication of this worry within a Bayesian framework, and offers the Entitlement theorist two distinct responses.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)566-580
Number of pages15
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Issue number3
Early online date29 Mar 2022
Publication statusPublished - May 2023


  • entitlement theory
  • leaching problem
  • epistemic risk
  • evidential justification
  • scepticism
  • hinge epistemology
  • cornerstone


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