Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory

J. Adam Carter*, Jesper Kallestrup

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to 'extended-memory cases' (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: In §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments do not violate what we call 'the epistemic parity principle'. In §2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in §3 several lines of response.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)691-714
Number of pages24
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Issue number3
Early online date10 Jan 2015
Publication statusPublished - May 2016

Bibliographical note

The authors would like to thank JC Bjerring, Jacob Busch, Sandy Goldberg, Emma C. Gordon, Lars Gundersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen, Rob Rupert, Orestis Palermos, Duncan Pritchard and an audience at Eidyn research centre for helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. Thanks also to the editor and an anonymous referee at Philosophy and Phenomenological Research who offered a number of very helpful suggestions. This article was written as part of the AHRC‐funded ‘Extended Knowledge’ (#AH/J011908/1) research project that is hosted by the University of Edinburgh's Eidyn research centre.


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