Extending Attack-Fault Trees with Runtime Verification

Rafael C. Cardoso, Angelo Ferrando, Michael Fisher

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

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Abstract

Autonomous systems are often complex and prone to software failures and cyber-attacks. We introduce RVAFTs, an extension of Attack-Fault Trees (AFTs) with runtime events that can be used to construct runtime monitors. These monitors are able to detect when failures, that can be caused either by an attack or by a fault, occur. The safety and security properties monitored are, in turn, derived from the hierarchical decomposition of RVAFTs. Our approach not only provides further use of AFTs, but also improves the process of instrumentation often required in runtime verification. We explain the principles and provide a simple case study demonstrating how RVAFTs can be used in practice. Through this we are also able to evaluate the detection of faults and attacks as well as assessing the computational overhead of the monitors.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)193-207
Number of pages15
JournalElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, EPTCS
Volume371
Early online date27 Sept 2022
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 27 Sept 2022
Event4th International Workshop on Formal Methods for Autonomous Systems, FMAS 2022 and 4th International Workshop on Automated and Verifiable Software sYstem DEvelopment, ASYDE 2022 - Berlin, Germany
Duration: 26 Sept 202227 Sept 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
*Part of Cardoso’s and Fisher’s work was supported by The Royal Academy of Engineering under the Chair in Emerging Technologies scheme and by EPSRC under project EP/V026801 (Trustworthy Autonomous Systems “Verifiability Node”).

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