Abstract
Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most general and developed view to this effect is Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Moretti (2018) has shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 253-271 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 22 Aug 2018 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Keywords
- phenomenal conservatism
- seemings
- inferential justification
- reflective awareness
- inferential scepticism
- Michael Huemer
- entitlement theory
- inferential seemings
- Inferential justification