@inbook{e8543c54e3e3424f854088b41a02a1bf,
title = "Knowing from not knowing",
abstract = "Arguments from ignorance are typically fallacious: one shouldn{\textquoteright}t infer that p is true merely from the fact that p isn{\textquoteright}t known to be false. The reason one cannot invariably come to know that p on the basis of lack of knowledge that not-p is that p may well be false even though one hasn{\textquoteright}t been in a position to know that not-p. The qualifiers {\textquoteleft}typically{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}invariably{\textquoteright} are key here. In cases where one would have known that not-p had p been false, reasoning from ignorance seems perfectly kosher, indeed where one knows that counterfactual independently, one is positioned to gain knowledge. Goldberg (2010a; 2010b) has developed a set of conditions sufficient for such epistemic coverage to obtain in the domain of social epistemology. This paper elaborates, extends and critically discusses Goldberg{\textquoteright}s pioneering framework.",
author = "Jesper Kallestrup",
year = "2016",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1163/9789004312654_004",
language = "English",
isbn = "9789004319103",
series = "Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities",
publisher = "Brill Rodopi",
pages = "41--55",
editor = "Adrian Kuzniar and Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska",
booktitle = "Uncovering Facts and Values",
}