Knowing how to establish intellectualism

Daniele Sgaravatti, Elia Zardini

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)217-261
Number of pages45
JournalGrazer Philosophische Studien
Publication statusPublished - 1 Oct 2008

Bibliographical note

Publisher version cannot be used
Published source must be acknowledged
Must link to publisher version


Dive into the research topics of 'Knowing how to establish intellectualism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this