Management of Knowledge Workers

Hans K. Hvide, Erik Gaard Kristiansen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)
5 Downloads (Pure)


We study how firm-specific complementary assets and intellectual property
rights affect the management of knowledge workers. The main results show
when a firm will wish to sue workers who leave with innovative ideas and the
effects of complementary assets on wages and on worker initiative. We show
that firms protected weakly by complementary assets must sue leaving workers
in order to obtain positive profits. Moreover, firms with more complementary
assets pay higher wages and have lower rates of turnover, but the higher pay
has a detrimental effect on worker initiative. Finally, our analysis suggests that
strengthening firms’ property rights protection reduces turnover costs but weakens
worker initiative.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)815-838
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Law and Economics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2012


Dive into the research topics of 'Management of Knowledge Workers'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this