Non-Evidentialist Epistemology

Luca Moretti, Nikolaj Pedersen

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Abstract

This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, and mathematics.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherBrill
Number of pages267
ISBN (Electronic)978-90-04-46553-4
ISBN (Print)978-90-04-39895-5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Jun 2021

Publication series

NameBrill Studies in Skepticism
PublisherBrill
Volume3
ISSN (Electronic)2215-177X

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