Phenomenal Conservatism

Luca Moretti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits of phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinized and appraised in the next chapters.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSeemings and Epistemic Justification
Subtitle of host publicationHow Appearances Justify Beliefs
Place of PublicationCham, Switzerland
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Number of pages17
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-43392-5
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-43391-8
Publication statusPublished - 10 Mar 2020

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Philosophy
ISSN (Print)2211-4548
ISSN (Electronic)2211-4556


  • Appearances
  • Epistemic internalism
  • Epistemic justification
  • Huemer’s self-defeat argument
  • Meta-justification
  • Phenomenal conservatism
  • Phenomenal force
  • Rational commitment
  • Seemings


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