Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things

Kevin McCain, Luca Moretti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review


Matthew McGrath has recently challenged all theories that allow for immediate perceptual justification. This challenge comes by way of arguing for what he calls the “Looks View” of visual justification, which entails that our visual beliefs that are allegedly immediately justified are in fact mediately justified based on our independent beliefs about the looks of things. This paper shows that McGrath’s arguments are unsound or, at the very least, that they do not cause genuine concern for the species of dogmatism called “Phenomenal Explanationism”, recently introduced and defended by Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSeemings
Subtitle of host publicationNew Arguments, New Angles
EditorsKevin McCain, Scott Stapleford, Matthias Steup
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2 Aug 2022


  • looks
  • Matthew McGrath
  • phenomenal
  • dogmatism
  • perceptual justification
  • defeat
  • explanationism
  • view


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