Reliabilist justification: Basic, easy, and brute

Jesper Kallestrup*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


Process reliabilists hold that in order for a belief to be justified, it must result from a reliable cognitive process. They also hold that a belief can be basically justified: justified in this manner without having any justification to believe that belief is reliably produced. Fumerton (1995), Vogel (2000), and Cohen (2002) have objected that such basic justification leads to implausible easy justification by means of either epistemic closure principles or so-called track record arguments. I argue that once we carefully distinguish closure principles from transmission principles, and epistemic consequences from epistemic preconditions, neither version of this objection succeeds.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)155-171
Number of pages17
JournalActa Analytica
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2009


  • Closure principles
  • Cohen
  • Easy justification
  • Fumerton
  • Reliabilism
  • Vogel


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