Abstract
A growing number of great powers are investing political capital and financial resources in developing the field of artificial intelligence technology and AI-enhanced autonomous weapons systems, seeking to derive the maximum potential military benefits—at a tactical, operational, and strategic level—these systems offer. The likely ubiquity of these new classes of advanced capabilities—and the incentives for militaries to adopt them—on the future battlefield is fast becoming a foregone certainty. There is little research that indicates how existing concepts of escalation, nuclear terrorism, and classical deterrence theories might apply (or be tested) in the digital age—increasingly defined by developments in AI and autonomy—where perfect information and rational decision making cannot be assumed.
How might the rise of these capabilities weaken or strengthen deterrence? How might non-human agents’ introduction into a crisis or conflict between nuclear powers affect deterrence, escalation, and strategic stability? Are existing theories of deterrence still applicable in the age of AI and autonomy?
How might the rise of these capabilities weaken or strengthen deterrence? How might non-human agents’ introduction into a crisis or conflict between nuclear powers affect deterrence, escalation, and strategic stability? Are existing theories of deterrence still applicable in the age of AI and autonomy?
Original language | English |
---|---|
Specialist publication | Modern War Institute at West Point |
Publication status | Published - 28 Jan 2021 |