Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument

Joshua Rowan Thorpe

doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1126-3

Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument

Joshua Rowan Thorpe^* (Corresponding Author)

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

University of Campinas

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Putnam’s vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or conclusion of the argument that beg the question against the sceptic. In this paper, I show that this idea is mistaken.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2289-2306
Number of pages	18
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	176
Early online date	18 Jun 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1126-3
Publication status	Published - Jun 2018

Bibliographical note

Thanks to Crispin Wright, Peter Sullivan, Adrian Haddock, David Horst and Bernhard Salow for helpful discussion. This paper benefited greatly from being presented at a Philosophy Work in Progress Seminar at the University of Campinas, a Knowledge Beyond Natural Science Project Seminar at Stirling University, and a Philosophy of Language Group Seminar at Edinburgh University. I would like to thank all three audiences for their comments. An anonymous referee at Philosophical Studies also provided comments which have greatly improved the paper. I am grateful for a research grant from the São Paulo Research Foundation (Grant ID No. 2016/03277-1) that allowed me to complete this paper.

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abstract = "Putnam{\textquoteright}s vat argument is intended to show that I am not a permanently envatted brain. The argument holds promise as a response to vat scepticism, which depends on the claim that I do not know that I am not a permanently envatted brain. However, there is a widespread idea that the vat argument cannot fulfil this promise, because to employ the argument as a response to vat scepticism I would have to make assumptions about the content of the premises and/or conclusion of the argument that beg the question against the sceptic. In this paper, I show that this idea is mistaken.",

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Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument

Abstract

Bibliographical note

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