Testimonial Injustice from Countervailing Prejudices

Federico Luzzi

doi:10.1080/02691728.2023.2291765

Testimonial Injustice from Countervailing Prejudices

Federico Luzzi^* (Corresponding Author)

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper I argue that Fricker’s (2007, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017) influential account of testimonial injustice (hereafter ‘TI’) should be expanded to include cases of TI from mutually neutralising countervailing prejudices. In this kind of case, the hearer is given due credibility by the speaker. I describe a relevant case, defend it from objections, highlight how it differs from extant cases of due-credibility TI, and describe its distinctive features. This case demonstrates how paying attention to the way multiple prejudices operate in concert leads to expanding the repertoire of cases of TI and casts light on the harms of TI

Original language	English
Journal	Social Epistemology
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2291765
Publication status	Published - 13 Dec 2023

Bibliographical note

Open Access via the Taylor and Francis Agreement

Keywords

testimonial injustice
credibility
prejudice
countervailing prejudices

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10.1080/02691728.2023.2291765

Luzzi_SE_Testimonial_Injustice_From_VOR
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4. 0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
Final published version, 576 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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AB - In this paper I argue that Fricker’s (2007, 2010, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017) influential account of testimonial injustice (hereafter ‘TI’) should be expanded to include cases of TI from mutually neutralising countervailing prejudices. In this kind of case, the hearer is given due credibility by the speaker. I describe a relevant case, defend it from objections, highlight how it differs from extant cases of due-credibility TI, and describe its distinctive features. This case demonstrates how paying attention to the way multiple prejudices operate in concert leads to expanding the repertoire of cases of TI and casts light on the harms of TI

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ER -

Testimonial Injustice from Countervailing Prejudices

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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