Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Society Self-Regulation: The Case of Roman Third-Sector and the "Mafia Capitale" Scandal

The purpose of this article is to test the effectiveness of the self-regulation against its own objectives/expected outcome and to map out reasons behind non-compliance. It focuses on a check-list of indicators (CDV) developed by Italian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the aftermath of the scandal “Mafia Capitale” when threatened by strict government regulation and by critical public opinion. Methodologically, this test of effectiveness is performed employing the blueprint designed by the One World Trust. To preview the outcome of this test of effectiveness, it will be concluded that self-regulation has been effective primarily in protecting the sector’s autonomy against hypothetical legislative interferences. Even if quantitative findings indicate a medium compliance rate, qualitative findings suggest that there can be many reasons behind noncompliance which sometimes do not depend entirely on CSO’s commitment to comply with voluntary standards. In this context, a distinction between objective and subjective noncompliance is drawn.