The Bayesian Objection

Luca Moretti*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that the objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with each another.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationSeemings and Epistemic Justification
Subtitle of host publicationHow Appearances Justify Beliefs
EditorsLuca Moretti
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-43391-8
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Publication series

NameSpringerBriefs in Philosophy
ISSN (Print)2211-4548
ISSN (Electronic)2211-4556


  • Bayesianism
  • Immediate and non-immediate justification
  • Inferential and non-inferential justification
  • Perceptual justification
  • Phenomenal conservatism
  • Reflective awareness
  • Reflective justification


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