In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that the objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with each another.
|Title of host publication
|Seemings and Epistemic Justification
|Subtitle of host publication
|How Appearances Justify Beliefs
|Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
|Number of pages
|Published - 2020
|SpringerBriefs in Philosophy
- Immediate and non-immediate justification
- Inferential and non-inferential justification
- Perceptual justification
- Phenomenal conservatism
- Reflective awareness
- Reflective justification