TY - CHAP
T1 - The Bayesian Objection
AU - Moretti, Luca
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that the objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with each another.
AB - In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that the objection doesn’t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on one’s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with each another.
KW - Bayesianism
KW - Immediate and non-immediate justification
KW - Inferential and non-inferential justification
KW - Perceptual justification
KW - Phenomenal conservatism
KW - Reflective awareness
KW - Reflective justification
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85103709622&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5_4
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-43392-5_4
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85103709622
SN - 978-3-030-43391-8
T3 - SpringerBriefs in Philosophy
SP - 57
EP - 69
BT - Seemings and Epistemic Justification
A2 - Moretti, Luca
PB - Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
ER -