The Limitations of the Consociational Arrangements in Iraq

The political crises in Iraq following the American invasion have triggered the need to revisit the power sharing arrangements established in the constitution and practised at the level of the political system. Since Iraq is a deeply divided society, consociationalism has been the main force of political reconstruction after the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. However, the
Iraqi constitution and the political system lack genuine consociational practices. The aim of this paper is to study the limitations of the consociational arrangements and offer prescriptions that may help ameliorate the challenges facing the fragile political system. The political system will be analysed within the framework of consociationalism and power sharing agreements. Two of Lijphart’s four conditions are absent in the consociational arrangements in Iraq: grand coalition and mutual veto, while two other characteristics of consociationalism, proportionality and autonomy, are strongly present but are not enough to preserve stability.