TY - JOUR
T1 - The Politics of Agency Death
T2 - Ministers and the Survival of Government Agencies in a Parliamentary System
AU - James, Oliver
AU - Petrovsky, Nicolai
AU - Moseley, Alice
AU - Boyne, George A.
PY - 2016/10
Y1 - 2016/10
N2 - This article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of powers to parliamentary government systems. It evaluates expectations of increased risk to agencies following transitions in government, prime minister or departmental minister, and from incongruence between the originally establishing and currently overseeing political executive. Using survival models for UK executive agencies between 1989 and 2012, the study finds that politics trumps performance. Ministers seek to make their mark by terminating agencies created by previous ministers, which is reinforced by high media attention to the agency. Performance against agency targets is not associated with higher termination risk, and replacement agencies do not perform any better than those that were terminated. Financial autonomy provides some protection for agencies that are less dependent on budgetary appropriations.
AB - This article extends the theory of government agency survival from separation of powers to parliamentary government systems. It evaluates expectations of increased risk to agencies following transitions in government, prime minister or departmental minister, and from incongruence between the originally establishing and currently overseeing political executive. Using survival models for UK executive agencies between 1989 and 2012, the study finds that politics trumps performance. Ministers seek to make their mark by terminating agencies created by previous ministers, which is reinforced by high media attention to the agency. Performance against agency targets is not associated with higher termination risk, and replacement agencies do not perform any better than those that were terminated. Financial autonomy provides some protection for agencies that are less dependent on budgetary appropriations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84921856913&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0007123414000477
DO - 10.1017/S0007123414000477
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84921856913
SN - 0007-1234
VL - 46
SP - 763
EP - 784
JO - British Journal of Political Science
JF - British Journal of Political Science
IS - 4
ER -
