Abstract
We investigate whether and how a change in performance-related payment motivated General Practitioners (GPs) in Scotland. We evaluate the effect of increases in the performance thresholds required for maximum payment under the Quality and Outcomes Framework in April 2006. A difference-in-differences estimator with fixed effects was employed to examine the number of patients treated under clinical indicators whose payment schedules were revised and to compare these with the figures for those indicators whose schedules remained unchanged. The results suggest that the increase in the maximum performance thresholds increased GPs' performance by 1.77% on average. Low-performing GPs improved significantly more (13.22%) than their high-performing counterparts (0.24%). Changes to maximum performance thresholds are differentially effective in incentivising GPs and could be used further to raise GPs' performance across all indicators
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 353-371 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Health Economics |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 3 |
Early online date | 5 Jan 2014 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Mar 2015 |
Bibliographical note
AcknowledgementsThis paper was carried out whilst Yan Feng was a PhD student in the Health Economics Research Unit, University of Aberdeen. The PhD was funded by the Institute of Applied Health Sciences, University of Aberdeen PhD studentship. The paper was written up when Yan was working in the Office of Health Economics (OHE). We would like to thank Luís Silva Miguel and the audience for their comments on this work during the tenth European Health Economics Workshop. We also thank Hugh Gravelle, Nancy Devlin, Stephen Morris, Marjon van der Pol, Robert Elliot and Mandy Ryan for their comments and suggestions. The Health Economics Research Unit (HERU) is funded by the Chief Scientist Office of the Scottish Government Health Directorates (SGHD). The views in this paper are those of the authors and not HERU, SGHD or OHE.
Keywords
- financial incentives
- quality and outcomes framework
- general practitioners
Fingerprint
Dive into the research topics of 'The Tougher the Better: An Economic Analysis of Increased Payment Thresholds on the Performance of General Practices'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Profiles
-
Shelley Farrar
- School of Medicine, Medical Sciences & Nutrition, Health Economics Research Unit - Research Fellow
- Institute of Applied Health Sciences
Person: Academic Related - Research