Abstract
In his 1987 paper ‘Truth or Consequences,’ Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policy-making: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, notwithstanding the social consequences thereof, the latter must primarily
be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are actively engaged in policy-making, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. In this paper we paint a richer and more optimistic picture. We argue that while the methods of theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy do differ in important ways, the difference is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself. Engaging with and being led by the constraints and messy reality of public and professional life can involve moral and methodological challenges, but we reject the idea that these are ‘costs’ of applied philosophy. Rather, they open up new for a for philosophical engagement
be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are actively engaged in policy-making, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. In this paper we paint a richer and more optimistic picture. We argue that while the methods of theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy do differ in important ways, the difference is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself. Engaging with and being led by the constraints and messy reality of public and professional life can involve moral and methodological challenges, but we reject the idea that these are ‘costs’ of applied philosophy. Rather, they open up new for a for philosophical engagement
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 523-538 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Metaphilosophy |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 3 Jul 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 29 Jul 2023 |
Bibliographical note
This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust [209811/Z/17/Z]. Thanks to Rob Simpson and Chris Winch for constructive comments on an early version of the paper, and to faculty and students in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge who attended a talk based on this essay and pressed us on several important points. Many thanks also to an anonymous reviewer who provided valuable critical comments leading to substantial revisions.
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