Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Bruno Yun* (Corresponding Author), Srdjan Vesic, Nir Oren

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, prove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)195-208
Number of pages14
JournalArgument and Computation
Issue number2
Early online date10 Jun 2021
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2022


  • cs.AI
  • cs.GT
  • Argumentation
  • Game theory
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Pure strategy


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