Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries

Dylan Dodd*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


Several philosophers have claimed that S knows p only if S' s belief is safe, where S's belief is safe iff (roughly) in nearby possible worlds in which S believes p, p is true. One widely held intuition many people have is that one cannot know that one's lottery ticket will lose a fair lottery prior to an announcement of the winner, regardless of how probable it is that it will lose. Duncan Pritchard has claimed that a chief advantage of safety theory is that it can explain the lottery intuition without succumbing to skepticism. I argue that Pritchard is wrong. If a version of safety theory can explain the lottery intuition, it will also lead to skepticism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-120
Number of pages26
Issue number1
Early online date10 Jul 2011
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2012

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  • counterfactuals
  • knowledge
  • chances


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  • NIP Public

    Luca Moretti (Coordinator), Dylan Dodd (Coordinator), Carl Edward Baker (Coordinator), Aidan McGlynn (Coordinator) & Francesco Berto (Coordinator)


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